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The Role of Auditing Theory in Education and Practice 
Robert E. Hamilton 
University of Minnesota 
Audi t activities are receiving increased public attention and scrutiny. W i t h 
public institutions increasingly being the subject of auditors' activities and with 
public disclosure occurring of the financial and operating results of large C P A 
firms, there is an increasing demand for explanations of the auditor's role i n 
our society. The expansion of audit activities performed by governmental, in -
ternal, and external auditors likewise has not gone unnoticed. N e w audit pro-
cedures, new forms of audit organization, and new institutional arrangements 
have been rapidly introduced without a simultaneous infusion of explanations 
which are grounded i n theory. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the nature of a theory of auditing 
which would improve the underpinnings for explanations of audit activities 
and to identify specific linkages between improvements in theory and difficult 
problems in auditing education and practice. A theory of auditing can help i m -
prove our understanding of the role for auditing in society and thus improve 
the ability of society's members to design institutional structures and to take 
actions which lead to desired outcomes. 
A u d i t i n g is a term associated with activities having specified characteristics. 
A n auditing theory should describe these activities and their particular con-
figurations and intensities. It should explain using differing relative amounts 
of substantive and compliance testing and differences in the amount of resources 
used to audit a public versus a private entity. These two matters are but illus-
trative of a larger set which is concerned wi th describing why observed auditing 
activities are what they are. If this view of auditing theory appears limited, 
there is an additional discussion of auditing theory i n a subsequent section of 
this paper which should expand the horizon. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized in the following way. 
A discussion and review of developments i n auditing theory is presented along 
with a description of the characteristics appropriate for an auditing theory. The 
two subsequent sections contain a more specific discussion and development of 
ways in which auditing theory can impact education and practice. T h e final 
section is a prospective on future developments in auditing theory. 
Where are W e i n A u d i t i n g Theory? 
Before a role for auditing theory can be identified there exists the steps of 
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identifying where we are i n auditing theory. If it is found that no auditing 
theory exists then there is extreme difficulty i n an identification of the role for 
theory. A t that point the process turns to identifying a role for an auditing 
theory if only there were one like the theory under consideration. If the existing 
theory is so underdeveloped that it is difficult to show its value, then the issue 
is one of identifying the characteristics of a theory which would likely be of 
value. The second view is the one that obtains for much of what follows, yet the 
prospective indicates some reasons why such a theory can be and is likely to 
be produced. 
L o o k i n g to a closely related discipline for support revealed that there exists 
The Theory of Finance (Fama and Mil ler , 1972*). The claim is that "The theory 
of finance is concerned with how individuals and firms allocate resources through 
time. In particular, it seeks to explain how solutions to the problems faced in 
allocating resources through time are facilitated by the existence of capital 
markets, . . . and of firms . . . " If the view of auditing theorists is consistent 
with these finance theorists then it could be expected that the theory of auditing 
would seek to explain how solutions to problems faced i n allocating resources 
through time are facilitated by the existence of auditors, audit firms, and auditing 
institutions. Whi le it may not be the final word on the subject of the theory of 
auditing, the preceding description provides a sufficient starting point. In a 
simple form, the theory of auditing would explain the auditing activities in the 
world around us. The theory may not provide explanations as precise as may 
be desired, e.g., why some auditors wear vests and others do not. The theory 
may not tell auditors what they should do in every conceivable situation, and at 
the beginning the predictions of the theory may be surprising and the reasons 
may be counter-intuitive. Only through significant exposure to the reasoning 
and by continued testing and refinement of the theory can it be subjected to 
evaluation by individuals who may accept or reject the theory. More is reported 
on these points in the next section of this paper. For the moment, the focus is 
on the review of existing developments in auditing theory. 
N o lengthy history is provided as there are numerous reports on the history 
of developments in auditing which are more complete than is possible within 
the scope of this paper. The additional consideration that there should be con-
tinued improvements i n theory suggests that a review of history would wisely 
begin as late as possible so as to avoid a lot of changes which are not applicable. 
O u r review of auditing theory w i l l begin with the publication of The Philosophy 
of Auditing (Mautz and Sharaf) and conclude with recent working papers. 
A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts ( A S O B A C , 1972) is the second major 
audit theory publication during this time period. Numerous papers have de-
veloped and studied major elements of an auditing theory, but none are as com-
plete as the two cited works. 
In The Philosophy of Auditing it is stated that: 
It is our contention that there is a theory of auditing, that there 
exist a number of basic assumptions and a body of integrated ideas, the 
*See "References" at the conclusion of this paper for this and all other references 
similarly cited. 
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understanding of which w i l l be of direct assistance in the development 
and practice of the art of auditing. (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961, p. 1.) 
The authors' development proceeds from eight tentative postulates to the descrip-
tion of five auditing concepts: evidence, due audit care, fair presentation, in -
dependence, and ethical conduct. The process of conceptualizing i n ASOBAC, 
(p. 16), on the other hand, " . . . ends with a normative description and the 
pragmatic benefits may not be immediately apparent." H o w does either of these 
two works provide a basis for a theory of auditing? T h e first is represented 
as the philosophy of auditing and therefore it seems inappropriate to consider 
it as an auditing theory. In ASOBAC (p. 16) there is a representation that 
" T h i s study is an attempt to contribute to the development of a theory of audit-
i n g " and therefore it seems inappropriate to consider it to be a completed auditing 
theory. If the characteristics of a theory are present in either of these works, 
there has been sufficient time to refine and test the theory. What has been the 
recent history? 
Both of these works have been widely quoted and cited in subsequent re-
ports on studies of auditing so that a broad exposure to the ideas and conclusions 
contained i n both ASOBAC and The Philosophy of Auditing appears to have 
resulted. Have these works led to tests of their ideas and conclusions? I am 
unaware of any reported empirical test i n auditing which has directly used the 
ideas and conclusions in these works as a means to theoretically support the 
tested hypotheses. Instead most, if not all , of the auditing research which uses 
observations of audit or audit-related activities has formulated hypotheses i n 
an ad hoc manner. Consider, for example, Warren's (1975) test of the uniformity 
of auditing standards. In this case, there were a number of hypotheses, each 
one of which would provide an hypothesis that the incidence of qualified 
opinions would be uniform across C P A firms. T w o of the hypotheses were 
competition among C P A firms and uniformity i n application of auditing 
standards. Furthermore, it was assumed that there was no selection process 
taking place so that audit conditions were considered to be randomly distributed 
throughout the firms being studied. None of these necessary theoretical under-
pinnings come from the existing theories of auditing. 
The point here is not to single out the Warren study for criticism. Instead, 
the study is presented to provide an example, among many others, where it can 
be seen that auditing theory has not been directly beneficial i n providing the-
oretical support for a tested hypothesis. It is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however, to demonstrate that existing research has not used the existing theoretical 
structure in auditing for underpinnings. The issue here is whether it can be 
used, not that there is no current use. 
Refinements of Existing Theory 
In the second area of questioning, i.e., has the existing theory led to 
further refinements, there is also a lack of direct connections. One area that has 
received considerable attention is the theory of evidence (Kissinger, 1977; Toba, 
1975) as it has been further refined and logically examined from the beginnings 
of the concept of evidence as presented in The Philosophy of Auditing. ASOBAC 
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has been extended by W i l l (1974) to consider the environment which feeds into 
and is fed by the audit process. Yet neither of these areas has spawned under-
pinnings for empirical research. The further refinements i n the theory of evi-
dence lack specific relationships to the way in which particular levels of reliability 
are determined and thus have a significant ambiguity which precludes testing. 
The systems approach presented i n W i l l (1974) adds the consideration of i m -
portant environmental variables but does not provide for an operational specifica-
tion sufficient for testing. W h i l e the preceding remarks may appear critical of 
auditing theory developments and testing, there is room for an interpretation 
that the existing work is exploratory, and significant verifiable results are possible, 
but a long way off. Before turning to a discussion of the properties of a theory 
of auditing, the following remark made in The Philosophy of Auditing (p. 65) 
is worthy of consideration: 
. . . . conceptual models, even without empirical support, can be ex-
tremely effective i n the development of theory. Th is fact is important to 
us because we find the development of mathematical models, except 
possibly the most simple type, to be inapplicable i n auditing at this stage 
of development. 
Whether this statement would be different if it had been written i n 1978 instead 
of i n 1961 is of interest. Is there reason to believe that movement away from 
procedures effective i n developing theory to those effective for testing and vali-
dating theories has taken place? Is auditing research still i n the exploratory stage 
where existing research has the direction of future research activities as its goals, 
or is auditing research providing some knowledge about the world around us? 
In the final section on prospectives for auditing theory the more recent develop-
ments w i l l be described. A look at the properties for a theory of auditing and its 
value is next considered. 
Properties of a Theory of A u d i t i n g 
One general problem impeding the development and acceptance of auditing 
theory is its residence in the social sciences. Numerous arguments have been 
recorded to suggest that social science theory is different and more difficult to 
produce than is theory in the physical sciences. After a physical scientist presents 
the theory for behavior of a type of molecule and shows it to be supported by 
observation, there is not generally an outcry raised by molecules to reveal their 
thoughts that they really do not behave as the model says they do. Yet, if we 
look to the social sciences, we often find that this situation applies. Whether the 
difference in the social sciences is supportive or detractive for theory development 
is an open question. I suggest, however, that the developments i n the physical 
sciences would have been slower if protesting atoms had caused the attention 
of researchers to focus on detailed idiosyncracies of their behavior. In attempts 
to explain the finest detail, there is often a lost concentration on more general 
and likely more readily explainable phenomena. It is merely an issue of first 
things first. 
What qualities should an auditing theory have? It is obvious that the 
answer depends on the context i n which the theory is to be used. In a sense, 
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the production of auditing theory is like the production of technologies for use 
i n converting the factors of production into consumer goods. The desirability 
of qualities for an auditing theory then depends on what products it w i l l produce 
and how the products are valued. A u d i t i n g education and audit practice are 
examined later as to their use of the products of auditing theory. A t this point, a 
general examination of the properties of a theory of auditing is briefly conducted. 
A theory of auditing which facilitates comparison with other competing 
and complementary theories, which is presented so as to make validation possible 
and which provides results of interest to auditing educators and practitioners 
would be a significant addition to the current state of auditing theory. The 
existing theoretical base i n auditing appears not to satisfy these constraints. Use 
of a loose conceptualizing approach has hindered comparison and made validation 
difficult. If one looks at Toba's theory of audit evidence, its explicit develop-
ment did facilitate the response by Kissinger which has provided a clearer and 
more cogent relationship between the theory of evidence and auditors' reporting 
alternatives. Yet there is still a way to see if the theory of evidence explains the 
actual reporting behavior of auditors. The reason is that the theory of evidence 
has developed i n isolation of the institutional arrangements which reward and 
penalize auditors, clients, and others. It is much closer to a description of one 
way i n which an auditor may use evidence, and if the other alternatives are as 
explicitly developed, then there is the possibility of testing to see which theory 
best explains the way in which auditors behave. The question of how they 
should behave is then an issue i n the design of the institutional arrangements. 
If a theory of auditing is to be forthcoming it should include a systematic 
consideration of the major elements i n the practice of auditing: the institutional 
structure, the market for audited information, the characteristics of agents doing 
auditing, being audited, and using audited information, and consider the avail-
able auditing technology. What would be the details for the components of an 
auditing theory? A simple statement is that it would explain the demand for 
and the supply of auditors. Such a theory would permit an analysis of the effects 
on the supply of auditing of changing institutional arrangements, of expanding 
the subject matter of auditing, and of new technologies for producing audits. 
A Simplified V i e w of A u d i t i n g Theory 
A t a min imum, the theory should provide a way to characterize the pre-
viously mentioned items and to identify the effects due to their interacting. In 
this regard, consider the following simplified view of auditing theory: If there 
exists a government to enforce contracts, and due to differences i n wealth endow-
ments, inter. alia., individual agents i n an economy find it advantageous to put 
their wealth i n the charge of others, then contracts which reward performance 
may be based on numbers reported by the manager. If the owner of the wealth 
does not have a way to ensure the compliance of the reports with the contractual 
provisions or if the manager does not have a way to convince the owner of this, 
then certain contracts may not take place. If an auditor is incorporated into 
the arrangement to ascertain compliance and if the auditor is motivated to do 
so because of associated rewards and penalties, then valuable contracts could be 
formed and all w i l l be better off. The preceding is a brief and terse explanation 
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of how a theory of auditing may be developed. The theory would include the 
technology available to the auditor and the way i n which the information being 
audited affects the wealth of the owner and manager. This simple setting is 
more clearly developed and extended elsewhere (Hamil ton, 1975; Magee, 1977). 
The essential characteristic of this approach is to rely heavily upon the tools 
of economic analysis to provide an explanation of this economic phenomenon— 
auditing activity. It should not be that the economic analysis is accepted solely 
on the basis of its rigor, but also on its relevance i n rigorously explaining auditing 
activities. T o provide details on how a theory with these characteristics would 
assist educators and practitioners, the next two major sections of this paper w i l l 
provide a description of major issues that may be explained. 
Assistance to A u d i t i n g Education 
O n one hand, the area of auditing education may benefit more from psycho-
logical theories of learning which say something about the production of educa-
tion of any type. Yet a careful description of the nature of the learning require-
ments for auditing is necessary to make valid applications of the theories of 
learning. It is in this realm that auditing theory should be helpful. If, for 
example, one is trying to help students understand how to make decisions about 
the use of compliance and substantive tests, how does auditing theory help? 
D o sufficiently unambiguous definitions exist to permit an observer, armed wi th 
the definitions, to categorize actual audit activities into these two types of tests? 
C a n auditing theory demonstrate why it is important to make this choice? 
F r o m an economic standpoint, these tests are two different inputs for the pro-
duction of an audit. It appears that standard analysis would lead to a simple 
view of the production possibilities set and explain why the tests should be made 
a certain way. If students have an understanding of economic analysis from 
prerequisite courses, then it would be an appropriate language for conveying 
an audit issue to students. 
One advantage i n having a theory of auditing is that it can provide a struc-
ture for course content. A n overall view—the theory—can be outlined and then 
developed i n detail. The critical points of the theory can guide the time alloca-
tions for courses and the detailed interrelationships among the theory's elements 
can help to avoid misinterpretations based on considering only part of the prob-
lem. For example, the choice of penalty structure for auditors may be considered 
as a factor i n determining what is a reasonable amount of assurance. Then it 
is possible to say that within this penalty structure the auditor w i l l disclaim if 
he cannot obtain enough assurance. Understanding this relationship provides 
insights into how the auditor (or a coalition of auditors) would respond to a 
proposal which eliminates the option of reporting a disclaimer. 
A concern for time allocation to various coverages in an auditing course 
could be aided by a theory of auditing which identifies the major determinants 
of the auditor's decision process and how they are affected by changes in the 
environment. Those critical points of influence on audit decisions could be 
given sufficient time to assure that they are well understood, with the more 
sensitive variables studied in depth. A u d i t choice variables of a more technological 
character, e.g. electronic data processing and statistical sampling techniques, 
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could then become topics of much more detailed and specialized courses. 
A second advantage is that a theory of auditing should quickly highlight 
the differences in subject matter and environment for the different types of 
auditing, e.g. internal, external, and governmental. F r o m this, then, a common 
core of knowledge could be identified and specialized aspects of these differ-
ent areas recognized and covered in courses which detail the specialized environ-
mental features and how audit decisions are affected thereby. 
A third advantage which stems from having a theory of auditing is that 
it enables a systematic interpretation of evidence produced by researchers such 
that it can be communicated to students. W h e n a student leaves an auditing 
class, does the student know what researchers have found as descriptions of audit 
activities? A theory of auditing which structures the learning process would 
more readily permit an integration of research findings into the classroom. 
For example, if auditing theory can describe the effect of audit penalties on audit 
decisions, then alternative sampling approaches can be described in terms of the 
effect of the approach on the auditor's likelihood of having penalties imposed 
upon h i m . W h e n alternative confirmation techniques are discussed, as in Pro-
fessor Sorkin's paper that is included i n the proceedings of this symposium, then 
evidence about the reliability and costs of using different approaches can be con-
veyed to students within the theoretical structure. A major point to be empha-
sized here is that as a theory of auditing is systematically developed, then re-
searchers' results w i l l be related to the theory and this w i l l hasten the introduction 
of those results into the classroom. 
A fourth educational advantage derived from auditing theory is that it 
provides a rather complete, compact, and precise view of auditing which then 
enables a clear focus on the elements which explain why audit activities are what 
they are. The emphasis here is on providing an explanation which can serve as 
an aid to identifying and convincing students why activities which may at first 
seem counterintuitive are not necessarily so. The theory takes simple and familiar 
constructs and shows how they lead to the results. Errors of intuition may be 
uncovered and/or errors i n the theory may surface. If the theory of audits is 
too simple, this advantage may be lost. M y guess is that when a theory of audit-
ing is developed it w i l l be valuable in permitting a communication of the com-
plexities of the factors which determine audit activities. Conversely, it w i l l be 
difficult to comprehend some of the more important complexities in the absence 
of a theory of auditing. 
Addit ional Advantages Related to Education 
T w o remaining advantages deserve attention. Other, less direct, effects 
may also be of importance in education. First, it is likely that a rather general 
theory which involves general phenomena w i l l be at the base of a theory of 
auditing and that the communication and understanding of this theory w i l l be 
of importance to a general business student audience. The economics of con-
tracting and the attendant moral hazard and information asymmetry issues ap-
pear to be affected by auditing mechanisms. W i t h a generic structure of the 
problem there is the possibility that much of this general theory can be covered 
i n an introductory course with external auditing, internal auditing and govern-
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mental auditing as special cases within the theory of auditing. Jensen and 
Meckl ing (1976) report on a theory of agency which considers the incentives 
for monitoring and bonding activities of managers. It is a preliminary start on 
what might be the foundation of a theory of auditing. The theory then should 
be capable eventually of explaining the conditions which result i n auditing ac-
tivities being done i n different ways within different organizational settings. 
Just as micro-economics provides explanations about the production decisions of 
firms under different conditions, a theory of auditing would explain the effects 
on auditing activities that result from different conditions in the environment. 
In "The Role of Securities i n the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing," 
A r r o w (1964) provides an explanation as to the reason why securities are intro-
duced into a society. W i t h i n the study of auditing, it would seem that, at a 
minimum, a theory of auditing should show why an economy w i l l be better off 
if auditors can provide their services. Yet, there is currently no well detailed 
exposition of this matter, and a theory of auditing which does so w i l l provide 
a basis for a body of knowledge of wide applicability. Many activities in society 
involve contracting which critically depends on costly verification or observation 
mechanisms. Radner (1968) has shown that without mutual observation of 
states, there is little to suggest that claims on those states w i l l be traded. A t issue 
is the simultaneous consideration of the costs to verify states of the world and 
the value from being able to contract and exchange resource claims. Audit- l ike 
activities are a significant resource-consuming process of state verification which 
is assumed in most models of resource allocation mechanisms. A n understanding 
of the nature of these activities is essential to understanding why one mechanism 
is preferred to another. 
The second effect of having a theory of auditing which indirectly affects 
education is identified with research i n auditing. W i t h a theory, there should 
be clearer focus on the major unsolved issues and an easier identification of un-
tested claims so that researchers can more readily identify interesting problems. 
By making it easier to do research in auditing, the supply of high quality research 
should increase (possibly along wi th the supply of low quality research as well) 
and should enhance the flow of knowledge about the world of auditing to the 
student of auditing. 
There are many advantages of a theory of auditing for audit education. 
Each is dependent upon that theory to generate a complete, compact, and con-
sistent story about auditing activities. When a theory of auditing comes into 
existence, there w i l l be a change i n the approach for viewing many aspects of 
auditing. A Statement on A u d i t i n g Standards w i l l not be the subject of direct 
theoretical validation. Instead, there w i l l be a concern for identifying the factors 
which explain why the actions described i n the statement are consistent with 
the theory of auditing and for evaluating the effect of the statement on the supply 
and demand for audits. 
Effect on A u d i t i n g Practice 
A recent view of accounting theory production has been that it creates a 
product aimed at "the market for excuses" (Watts and Zimmerman, 1977). A 
similar possibility exists for auditing theory. W h e n there are changes in the 
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"rules of the game" which reallocate resources, then there is an incentive for 
providing "theory" to support the allocation which favors one group. A n 
affected group seeks the "theory" that w i l l support a resulting allocation that w i l l 
be i n their favor. 
T o understand the incentives for buying excuses it is necessary to have a 
theory to explain how the activities of the world would change as the "rules of 
the game" are changed. This type of theory is not of the excusing type but of 
the explaining variety. This theory would explain which groups w i l l buy which 
excuses. A theory of auditing would, i n general, seek to explain why auditing 
is a preferred social activity, and in the process identify the specific nature of 
the effects of introducing auditing as these effects relate to resource allocations 
and production plans. 
In audit practice, there are at least four aspects of choice problems concerned 
with auditing: the individual auditor, the C P A f irm, the auditing profession, 
and the social choice mechanism. A theory of auditing would seek to explain 
how these choice problems are resolved. For example, at the individual auditor 
level there are numerous problems of choice that are dependent upon an indi-
vidual's position i n the firm. One of the more important types of individual 
auditor activities is concerned with characterizing different client settings and 
selecting from among alternative ways of obtaining evidence. A t this level of 
choice, there is essentially a production technology problem. The assistance 
would come in the form of a theory which identified the major distinct charac-
teristics of clients and related them to their effects on the cost and reliability of 
alternative types of evidence. 
A t the individual choice level, it would be expected that the theory of 
auditing would identify the advantages of using both local (or individual) 
auditor knowledge and the advantages of using specialists i n other types of 
knowledge to aid in the acquisition of evidence. A t the individual auditor level, 
the theory would be heavily embedded i n the technology of evidence collection. 
Evaluation of the evidence and choosing specific forms of evidence would likely 
be subject to significant influences from elsewhere. 
In a C P A firm wherein there is a sharing of risks, there would be benefit 
to including a theory of risk sharing to assist i n explaining how firms are or-
ganized. D o monetary incentives to auditors improve the risk sharing, or are 
quality control reviews and admonitions more effective? Are the clients i n the 
C P A firm's portfolio of clients consistent with the firm's members' attitudes to-
ward risk? Recent advances i n team theory, syndicate theory and other areas 
provide a structure for evaluating this type of firm policy. A n understanding 
of portfolio theory can provide the basis for examining the effects of client mix 
on audit risk, although this is a difficult application since the major step involves 
characterizing audit risks i n the portfolio context. Obvious advantages from 
specialization also influence the solution to the client mix problem. The charac-
teristics (or attributes) of individual auditors within the C P A firm are another 
dimension which is the subject of a firm's recruiting and training policies. The 
structure and size of C P A firms make them a rather interesting and unique 
object for research. 
A t the professional level there is a choice problem concerning the activities 
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of the profession and its ability to serve its constituency. Essentially, coalition 
actions are taken, and they should likely be i n the best interests of the coalitions. 
When they are not, there is an increasing likelihood that the coalition w i l l splinter, 
as has been the recent experience of the A I C P A with respect to a revision i n its 
structure to recognize two different types of practice. Professional activities i n -
clude other functions such as the efficient production and dissemination of spe-
cialized knowledge. These activities are also capable of analysis in economic 
terms. W h e n the total professional fund is unequally provided by members and 
the services are unevenly valued, there is a concern for the stability of the coalition. 
A theory of auditing can assist the profession i n at least one other way. 
W i t h the profession serving to represent its members' activities to others, there 
is an advantage stemming from having a tested theory which explains what 
goes on i n the profession. A well constructed and tested descriptive theory of 
concentration within the C P A industry would have been very useful i n the re-
cent Metcalf hearings. Extensive economic studies of concentration have been 
done for other industries. W h y has such a study not been done for C P A s ? 
One problem is a lack of data, and one advantage of a professional association is 
that it can give anonymity to individual data and at the same time report sig-
nificant research results. 
The social or governmental aspect of decision making is characterized by 
its large, heterogeneous constituency. A s government regulations are promul-
gated, the effects of complying with these "rules of the game" are pervasive i n 
their potential impact. A t this level, the major analytic difficulties stem from the 
problems associated wi th the construction of a social choice function. O n the 
other hand, empirical problems surface i n the difficulties associated with the 
development of interpretive models for economy-wide phenomena. Yet, the in -
dividual or group of individuals that set the "rules of the game" act as i f they 
have made a choice among the alternatives. It would appear that there is room 
for descriptive models i n an auditing theory and that these models would pro-
vide for a tested theory which explains the effects of alternatives but does not 
provide rules for choice. 
A warning is provided to close this discussion of auditing practice. There 
have been significant developments i n auditing research, yet if the earlier re-
marks are correct one can expect that there has not been a very rigorous logical 
validation and testing of the claims. A t the individual auditor or firm level of 
choice, there is then a danger i n using existing theory to design policies when 
the theory is not well grounded, verified, and supported. Is it not more reasonable 
to rely on intuition and experience than to shift to untested and possibly invalid 
theories as a guide for policy making? 
The last ten years in accounting research have witnessed a problem i n the 
use of theoretical structure. A s the efficient market research developed, the 
emphasis has been on a continued testing and validation of the theory i n that 
there was concern as to the conclusions that the delayed receipt of a set of 
financial statements did not impact share prices. Instead of viewing this as a 
model which did not explain why accounting is a pervasive activity it was, at 
times, viewed as heresy. After ten years of pursuing a non-explanation, there 
is an increasing tendency to look elsewhere for explanations. Ross (1977) and 
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Beaver (1978) provide details on this point. In fact, understanding other uses 
of accounting numbers such as for compensation contracts, bond indenture pro-
visions and industry regulatory provisions may be likely explanations for the 
activities taking place i n accounting and auditing, and these are not inconsistent 
wi th the efficient market results. Hakansson (1977) provides a clear and de-
tailed picture of the comparative advantages of accounting information over 
other types of information i n a market setting. H e concludes with the following 
remark (p. 414): 
However, the crucial point is that what is to be defined as a sig-
nificant event and the amount of auditor involvement that is desirable 
must be the result of data collection, analysis and calculation. N o one 
is i n a position to spell out convincingly i n detail what is significant 
enough to be disclosed immediately and what the auditor's role should 
be without engaging in . . . cost-benefit analysis. 
The cost-benefit analysis suggested is that which looks at the effects on resource 
allocations and considers the comparative advantage of alternative information 
producers. 
A Prospective on Auditing Theory 
A reader of the proceedings of Audi t ing Symposium I (Stettler, 1972) may 
believe that the change in approach over the intervening years has been to now 
have a paper on "Toward a Theory of A u d i t i n g " as distinct from a paper on 
" T o w a r d a Philosophy of A u d i t i n g " (Mautz, 1972). Is there anything new here, 
or is this merely an unadvertised and well-developed "Columbus Complex" re-
flecting "Academic Amnesia" (Carmichael, 1976, p. 5)? The change to theory 
is to emphasize the requirements for testing and validation. As stated in Mautz 
(1972, p. 85) the archaic definitions of philosophy included reasoned science 
and the sciences as formerly studied i n the universities. O n the other hand, 
included was the non-archaic definition that philosophy is knowledge of the gen-
eral laws that furnish the rational explanation of anything. This last definition 
is consistent with part, but not all , of the requirements for a theory. 
This point is addressed by Mario Bunge (1967, p. 23) when he states: 
In particular, no synthetic formula follows from analytic formulas 
and no analytic formulas follow from synthetic ones; the mathematician 
cannot infer anything about the world on the strength of his mathe-
matical knowledge alone and, likewise, the physicist can establish no 
mathematical theorem on the basis of his factual knowledge. 
A n d , on science, Bunge (p. 29) states that: 
What science claims is ( i ) to be truer than any non-scientific model 
of the world, ( i i ) to be able to test such a truth claim, ( i i i ) to be able 
to discover its own shortcomings, and (iv) to be able to correct its own 
shortcomings, i.e., to build more and more adequate partial mappings 
of the patterns of the world. 
In essence, the advantage of theory or science is that it is tested with observations 
from the world around us. Alternative and conflicting theories can be tried in 
105 
the courts of data. Prior to testing, the communication of the logic is presumed 
to have taken place and to have been verified by others. The logic of the efficient 
markets research has been the subject of scrutiny and it has been tested. In the 
process, it has shown where accounting information is not very useful or valuable. 
Considerable theoretical modeling and testing must likewise be done to show 
how auditing is of value and the reasons why. Although solid results may be 
decades away, it is not implied that the goal should not be pursued. 
Questions raised within a philosophy of auditing are recast within a theory 
of auditing. For what and to whom auditors are responsible depends on answers 
to questions about the value of auditing and the technology to supply audits. 
Once a description of the demand for and supply of auditing is forthcoming, 
individuals can decide whether to produce audits and whether to pay the price 
for audits. This simplification of the problem to one of demand and supply 
analysis may appear to be extreme reductionism. O n the other hand, a descriptive 
understanding of the world around us would appear to be a prerequisite to 
policy making questions. 
Someone looking to the recorded auditing research should notice that a 
complete, logically and empirically defensible theory that explains the auditor's 
existence i n an economy is not present. Yet the same person may observe 
auditors conducting audits, research reports describing what auditors are and 
should be doing, and economic explanations of the functioning of an economy. 
One might reasonably expect that with a wealth of research into the activities 
of auditors and into descriptions of an economy wi th uncertainty, that the two 
could be brought together wi th valuable results. Can the described auditor ac-
tivities be shown to enhance the economy's utilization of resources? C a n the 
change i n the functioning of the economy with the introduction of auditors be 
evaluated i n terms of social or private benefits? What motivations exist that 
cause an individual to engage an auditor? These and other interesting questions 
can be resolved only if the auditor is modeled into the economy in a direct way. 
Earlier sections of this paper have omitted many specific references and 
descriptions of existing research i n this area. Hamil ton (1978) provides a more 
complete set of references and explanations and is available upon request. The 
scope for this paper was too broad to permit the detailed explanations and refer-
ences, but this is not to say that they are unimportant to the theme contained 
herein. Recent developments along the lines suggested in this paper are excel-
lently summarized and communicated in N g (1978). Thus, the focus in this 
paper has been on explaining some roles for a theory of auditing. 
Where are we i n auditing theory? What activities in society are viewed 
as auditing? H o w can these activities benefit from having a well developed 
theory of auditing? The preceding questions served as a frame for this paper 
on the role of auditing theory. 
What can one expect from a paper such as this? Describing the current state 
of auditing theory not only involves a given bibliographical set, but also involves 
a view as to the meaning of theory. Interpersonal differences i n assessing the 
state of auditing theory may be induced by either one or both of these elements. 
Identifying the practice of auditing is obviously a definitional problem and estab-
lishing the "goodness" of one definition over another ultimately rests i n estab-
106 
lishing the usefulness of the definition as a means for improving our under-
standing of auditing, improving auditing itself, and improving the world around 
us. W i t h the personalistic nature of the first item, the measurement difficulties 
associated with the second and the impossibilities for constructing social welfare 
measures for the third, there is reason to believe that a rigorous proof defending 
the definition's usefulness could not be provided herein. 
Demonstrating the impact of a well developed auditing theory on education 
and practice is likewise exceedingly equivocal. Anyone who has tried to defend 
a basic research proposal knows that the process is difficult and that the argu-
ments are generally insufficient for showing that the project should be funded. 
Yet, funded basic research projects provide a means for informed betting on 
knowledge changes on the part of the researcher and the funding agency. A s i n 
any area, some bets are won, others are lost. 
I have developed a description of my betting positions and an explanation 
of my reasons for taking these positions. I am sure that opening a market for 
these bets would generate a significant amount of betting. I hope that future 
developments i n auditing theory are such that al l of our bets can eventually be 
settled. Actions taken by C P A firms, auditors, congressional committees, regu-
latory agencies and others can also be viewed as falling wi th in a betting frame-
work wherein the individuals who take the actions are placing their individual 
welfare on the line. 
Concluding Observations 
The preceding sections of this paper have detailed why an auditing theory 
does not appear to exist and how such a theory would be of value to auditing 
educators and practitioners. Most basic to the viewpoint expressed here is that 
the necessary conditions for a solution to all auditing problems have not been 
established i n a theoretical structure which is shown to be consistent wi th the 
data from the world around us. These conditions are necessary for resolving 
auditing problems such as choices among confirmation formats or analytic audit-
ing approaches. A solution to these two problems, for example, requires either 
that the value of auditing be established (a welfare economics viewpoint) or 
that the auditor's penalty/reward structure be known (a microeconomic view-
point). W i t h i n a setting where auditing is a valued activity, the penalty/reward 
structure should be derived from the explanation of the demand for and supply 
of auditing. 
Individuals seeking resolution of auditing problems, whether the problems 
be governmental, internal, or external w i l l demand that other conditions be 
established for the variety of problems addressed. If auditing is an area of 
specialization, then the necessary conditions w i l l explain why auditing is dis-
tinguished from other activities. Yet the conditions w i l l be only necessary, and 
by no means sufficient, for resolving most of the interesting auditing problems. 
A s noted earlier, it is an issue of priorities and the suggestion here is similar to 
suggesting that climatic and geographic conditions are necessary conditions 
which must be established before one proceeds to identify the specifics of the 
problem of choosing a particular type of house and life style which is best for 
the individual involved. 
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